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And if your hand causes you to sin, cut it off: it is better for you to  
enter into life maimed, than having two hands to go into hell, 
 into the fire that shall never be quenched. 
            —Mark 9:43 (King James)
I.   INTRODUCTION
 On May 4, 2005, convicted Texas child molester Larry Don 
McQuay was released from prison. Again. McQuay, who had been a 
school bus driver in San Antonio, Texas, had been initially sentenced 
to eight years in prison for molesting a six-year-old boy in 1989.1
McQuay begged the state of Texas to surgically castrate him so that 
he would not repeat his crimes, which he admitted included molest-
ing over 200 children.2 McQuay stated that when he looks at a child, 
“ ‘I see a sex object . . . . I hate the things that I do.  I’m just scared 
 * B.A., San José State University, 1992; M.B.A., University of San Diego, 1999; 
J.D., Florida State University, 2006. I am grateful to Judge James R. Wolf, First District 
Court of Appeal, and Professor Benjamin J. Priester, Florida State University College of 
Law, for their comments and encouragement and to Les Garringer, Senior Attorney, Office 
of the State Courts Administrator, Florida, for providing the inspiration and seeds of re-
search for this Comment. 
 1. Sam Howe Verhovek, Texas Frees Child Molester Who Warns of New Crimes, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 9, 1996, at A7. 
 2. David Van Biema & Jordan Bonfante, A Cheap Shot at Pedophilia? California 
Mandates Chemical Castration for Repeat Child Molesters, TIME, Sept. 9, 1996, at 60. 
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that it’s going to happen. That’s why I want to get the surgery.’ ”3 His 
request was denied.4 McQuay’s letters from prison prompted the citi-
zens’ organization, Justice for All, to help him raise the funds to ob-
tain the surgery privately.5 Although the organization was successful 
in raising the funds, they could find no physician who was willing to 
perform the surgery.6
 In 1996, after having served six years of an eight-year sentence, 
Larry Don McQuay was released from prison for “good conduct,”7
even though he had stated that he would not only molest again, but 
kill his victims to prevent them from testifying against him.8 Dis-
mayed at the Texas court’s denial of McQuay’s request to be cas-
trated prior to his release, California Assemblyman Bill Hoge intro-
duced a bill in 1996 that was overwhelmingly passed by the Califor-
nia legislature requiring “chemical castration” of paroled, repeat 
child molesters.9
 Florida wasted no time in getting its own chemical castration 
statute on the books. In October of 1997, the legislature enacted sec-
tion 794.0235, Florida Statutes, which permits Florida’s courts to or-
der periodic administration of medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA) 
injections for individuals convicted of sexual battery and mandates 
such a court order upon an individual’s second conviction.10 The con-
troversial theory behind the statute is that forced administration of 
large doses of female hormones into male sex offenders who are 
placed on probation will significantly reduce the likelihood of recidi-
vistic sexual offenses.11
 On April 12, 2005, some seven years after Florida’s statute was 
enacted, Susan Maher, Deputy General Counsel for Florida’s De-
partment of Corrections (DOC), briefed the Senate Justice Appro-
priations Committee on the status of the implementation of Florida’s 
chemical castration statute.12 Maher reported that from the time the 
 3. Pedophile Who Sought Castration Is Released, ABC NEWS, May 4, 2005, 
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/LegalCenter/story?id=726907 [hereinafter ABC NEWS].
 4. See Christy Hoppe, Molesters Seeking Castration: Texas Examining Laws on Sex 
Offenders, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 13, 1995, at 45A. 
 5. Stacy Russell, Comment, Castration of Repeat Sexual Offenders: An International 
Comparative Analysis, 19 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 425, 429 (1997). 
 6. Id.
 7. Verhovek, supra note 1. 
 8. Pedophile Warns He Will Strike Again, CNN, Apr. 2, 1996, 
http://www.cnn.com/US/9604/02/child_molester/index.html. For the rest of the story, see
infra Part VI. 
 9. See Van Biema & Bonfante, supra note 2, at 60. 
 10. FLA. STAT. § 794.0235 (2006). 
 11. FLA. H.R. COMM. ON CRIME & PUNISHMENT, FINAL BILL RESEARCH AND ECONOMIC 
IMPACT STATEMENT, at 2-3 (1997) [hereinafter HOUSE STATEMENT].
 12. Memorandum from Les Garringer, Office of the State Courts Administrator, Flor-
ida, to Lisa Goodner, State Courts Administrator, Florida, 1 (May 27, 2005) (on file with 
author) [hereinafter Garringer Memo]. 
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statute was enacted in 1997 until the day of the briefing, circuit 
judges had failed to order chemical castration in 104 of the 107 cases 
in which such order had been statutorily mandated.13 This briefing 
has reignited the controversy over Florida’s chemical castration stat-
ute.14
 This Comment will discuss the background of Florida’s chemical 
castration statute, including why “chemical castration” is actually a 
misnomer, judicial attempts at ordering chemical castration prior to 
statutory authorization, the statutory evolution of chemical castra-
tion statutes in other states, and the characteristics of Florida’s own 
statute. It will then identify key legal problems with Florida’s stat-
ute, the most egregious of which are violations of the prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment, violations of both federal and 
state substantive due process interests, and violations of the doctrine 
of informed consent. It will then identify problems inherent in Flor-
ida's statute which make it difficult if not impossible to implement in 
its current form. Finally, this Comment will propose statutory 
changes to comport with the policy goals of probation, pass constitu-
tional muster, and overcome the implementation hurdles inherent in 
the current statute. 
II.   BACKGROUND OF FLORIDA’S CHEMICAL CASTRATION STATUTE
A.   “Chemical Castration”: Medical Myth 
 From ancient times until relatively recently in our own nation’s 
history, physical castration was considered an acceptable punish-
ment for a variety of crimes.15 Physical castration is a permanent 
deprivation of the male ability to produce testosterone, usually ac-
complished through surgical removal of the testes.16 The procedure, 
while disfiguring, has fewer nonsexual side effects than drug treat-
ment.17 Following World War II, castration as punishment fell out of 
favor in the United States18 and was ultimately declared unconstitu-
 13. Id.
 14. After the office of Governor Jeb Bush was contacted by a concerned citizen rec-
ommending the castration of sex offenders, Governor Bush, who was aware of the report, 
requested the Office of the State Courts Administrator to ascertain why the state’s courts 
have not been ordering the administration of MPA as provided by statute. Id. at 2. 
 15. See Kimberly A. Peters, Comment, Chemical Castration: An Alternative to In-
carceration, 31 DUQ. L. REV. 307, 308-09 (1993), for a description of the historical uses 
of castration. 
 16. Surgically removing the testes eliminates “virtually all testosterone from the 
[male] system, and thus disabl[es] the sex drive.” John F. Stinneford, Incapacitation 
Through Maiming: Chemical Castration, the Eighth Amendment, and the Denial of Human 
Dignity, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 559, 574 (2006). 
 17. Pamela K. Hicks, Comment, Castration of Sexual Offenders, 14 J. LEGAL MED.
641, 646 (1993).  
 18. Larry Helm Spalding, Florida’s 1997 Chemical Castration Law: A Return to the 
Dark Ages, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 117, 119 (1998). 
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tional as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.19
 Late twentieth-century biotechnological developments now enable 
the repression of testosterone in males without the disfiguring and 
irreversible consequences of physical castration. By regularly inject-
ing males with large doses of female hormones, production of testos-
terone can be significantly reduced.20 This similarity to the effect of 
physical castration has led to the popular adoption of the term 
“chemical castration.”21
 MPA, commercially know as Depo-Provera, was initially devel-
oped by Upjohn Pharmaceutical Company and is now widely pre-
scribed as a female oral contraceptive.22 When ingested by women 
in indicated doses, MPA is 99% effective in preventing preg-
nancy.23 While some women experience undesirable side effects, 
these are generally minimal and affect a woman’s sex drive in only 
1-5% of cases.24
 Although MPA was developed and approved by the FDA specifi-
cally for use in women, some physicians have found it to be an effec-
tive element of a treatment program for paraphilia in men.25
Paraphilia is an uncontrollable acting out of one’s specific sexual fan-
tasies in a socially unacceptable, often criminal way.26 Numerous 
studies have shown that administration of MPA in male paraphiliacs 
who have voluntarily participated in the treatment in conjunction 
with psychological counseling has been highly effective in preventing 
recidivistic incidents.27
 19. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536-38 (1942) (declaring unconstitutional, on 
equal protection grounds, the Oklahoma Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act, which re-
quired that certain repeat offenders be sentenced to a vasectomy). 
 20. Stinneford, supra note 16, at 572-74. 
 21. See Hicks, supra note 17, at 646. While popularly referred to as chemical castra-
tion, experts note that use of the drug does not actually amount to castration. Dr. Fred 
Berlin, Assistant Professor of Psychiatry at Johns Hopkins Medical School, points out 
that while the drug helps treated individuals control desire, “ ‘the therapy is neither 
castration nor sterilization.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Gauntlett, 352 N.W.2d 310, 315 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1984)). 
 22. Lisa Keesling, Comment, Practicing Medicine Without a License: Legislative At-
tempts to Mandate Chemical Castration for Repeat Sex Offenders, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
381, 385 (1999). It is also FDA-approved for use as a treatment for some types of cancer. 
See Linda Beckman, Chemical Castration: Constitutional Issues of Due Process, Equal Pro-
tection, and Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 100 W. VA. L. REV. 853, 856 (1998). 
 23. PHYSICIAN’S DESK REFERENCE 2717 (59th ed. 2005) (stating a typical failure rate 
of 0.1%) [hereinafter PDR]. 
 24. Id. at 2718. 
 25. Stinneford, supra note 16, at 572-76. 
 26. See Edward A. Fitzgerald, Chemical Castration: MPA Treatment of the Sexual Of-
fender, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 2 (1990). “Recognized paraphilias include pedophilia, exhibi-
tionism, transvestism, voyeurism, frotteurism, fetishism, sexual sadism, sexual maso-
chism, and other psychosexual disorders including some forms of rape.” Id. at 4-5. 
 27. Beckman, supra note 22, at 860-61. 
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 It is critical to note that MPA has not been shown to be an effec-
tive treatment of sex offenders in general. It has only been proven to 
be an effective treatment in paraphiliacs, and then only when admin-
istered under the following conditions: (1) the individual “volunteers 
for treatment”; (2) he “lacks an antisocial personality pathology”; (3) 
he “does not have a severe substance abuse problem”; (4) “the dosage 
is sufficient to suppress the testosterone production”; and (5) “a con-
senting, pair-bonded partner is available.”28
 Regular administration of MPA in men does produce one key simi-
lar effect to physical castration, that of reducing testosterone levels, 
but there are also many differences. Most notable is the reversible 
nature of that effect. Upon cessation of MPA treatment, testosterone 
levels typically revert to normal levels in seven to ten days.29 MPA is 
a treatment but not a cure. It has no long term benefits.30 When the 
treatment stops, the paraphiliac may revert to his former ways.31
 While the benefits of MPA treatment are reversible, many of the 
serious health consequences are not. The dosage typically adminis-
tered to paraphiliacs to eliminate the male sex drive ranges from 8.6 
to 43.3 times that which is recommended for female contraception.32
This discrepancy in dosage may have significant consequences in 
light of the drug’s severe side effects.33 Possible side effects of MPA 
include weight gain, decreased sperm count, hyperinsulinaemic re-
sponse to an increased glucose load, irregular gallbladder function-
ing, diverticulitus, fatigue, lethargy, testicular atrophy, diabetis mel-
litus, “hot and cold flashes, phlebitis, headaches, insomnia, nausea, 
nightmares, dyspnea, hyperglycemia, leg cramps, loss of body hair, 
increased basal body temperature,” malaise, pulmonary embolism, 
depression, cerebrovascular disorders, decreased bone mineral den-
sity, and aggravation of epilepsy, asthma, cardiac dysfunction, and 
renal dysfunction.34 Among the most alarming of these is the irre-
versible depletion of bone mineral density, which leads to the long-
term likelihood of “osteoporosis and multiple bone fractures as a re-
sult of [the] treatment.”35
 28. Fitzgerald, supra note 26, at 8-9. 
 29. See id. at 7. 
 30. Id. at 34. 
 31. Id.
 32. Stinneford, supra note 16, at 573. 
 33. Id.
 34. John McD. W. Bradford, The Hormonal Treatment of Sexual Offenders, 11 BULL.
AM. ACAD. OF PSYCHIATRY & L. 159, 163 (1983); Fitzgerald, supra note 26, at 7; Stinneford, 
supra note 16, at 658, 576. 
 35. Stinneford, supra note 16, at 568. 
1226 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1221 
                                                                                                                   
B.   Judicial Orders 
 Prior to the enactment of state chemical castration statutes, late-
twentieth-century courts sparked national debate over their at-
tempts to impose surgical or chemical castration as a condition of 
probation or other alternative to incarceration.36 In Texas, Judge Mi-
chael McSpadden agreed to defendant Steven Allen Butler’s request 
to allow the defendant to undergo surgical castration rather than 
stand trial for the sexual assault of a thirteen-year-old girl.37 After 
news of the agreement set off protests, and no doctor could be 
found to perform the surgery, the offer was called off,38 and Butler 
was convicted and sentenced to life in prison, the maximum sen-
tence for his offense.39
 In Michigan, Judge Robert L. Borsos ordered Roger A. Gaunt-
lett,40 who was convicted of criminal sexual intercourse with his four-
teen-year-old stepdaughter,41 to submit to chemical castration for the 
duration of his five-year probation sentence.42 Gauntlett challenged 
the sentence as being both unconstitutional and unlawful.43 The ap-
pellate court found it unnecessary to reach Gauntlett’s constitutional 
arguments,44 instead holding that the probation condition was 
unlawful based on lack of common law precedent,45 lack of statutory 
authority,46 and lack of “acceptance in the medical community as a 
safe and reliable medical procedure.”47
C.   Chemical Castration Statutes 
 On September 17, 1996, the legal landscape of chemical castration 
changed dramatically when Governor Pete Wilson signed Assembly-
man Bill Hoge’s bill, thereby enacting the first state statute mandat-
ing chemical castration as a condition of release for sex offenders.48
 36. See Keesling, supra note 22, at 390-91 for discussion of the national response to 
cases from recent years. 
 37. Choosing Castration, TIME, Mar. 16, 1992, at 33. 
 38. Man Who Chose Castration Is Convicted of Sex Assault, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1992, 
at A10. 
 39. See id.
 40. In an interesting coincidence, Gauntlett was an heir to Upjohn Corporation, the 
original makers of Depo-Provera. In his postsentencing remarks, Judge Borsos suggested 
that Gauntlett might want to make a contribution towards establishing a center for re-
search and treatment of sex offenders. People v. Gauntlett, 352 N.W.2d 310, 313 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1984). 
 41. Id. at 311. Gauntlett had also been charged with sexually fondling his twelve-
year-old stepson, but that charge was dropped as part of his plea agreement. Id.
 42. Id. at 313. 
 43. Id. at 314. 
 44. Id.
 45. Id.
 46. Id.
 47. Id. at 316. 
 48. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 645 (Deering 1997). 
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California’s law, which became effective on January 1, 1997, requires 
all individuals twice convicted of certain sex crimes involving victims 
under thirteen years of age to undergo MPA treatment as a condition 
of parole and permits such sentences for first offenders as well.49 The 
administration of MPA must continue until such time as the De-
partment of Corrections demonstrates that the treatment is no 
longer necessary.50 California’s law provides that the parolee shall be 
informed of the effects of treatment but requires only that the pa-
rolee acknowledge receipt of the information and not that the pa-
rolee consent to the treatment.51 A parolee may exempt himself 
from such a sentence only by voluntarily undergoing permanent 
surgical castration.52
 Since California enacted its chemical castration law, six other 
states have followed suit. Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, Montana, Ore-
gon, and Wisconsin have all enacted some form of chemical castra-
tion law.53 Of these, all but Oregon and Wisconsin determine eligibil-
ity for a sentence of chemical castration based on the underlying of-
fense of conviction.54 All but Florida and Oregon define the triggering 
offense as one in which the victim is a child.55
 Of the five states whose statutes determine eligibility based on 
the underlying offense, none of them requires that the offender be di-
agnosed with paraphilia or any sexual disorder at all prior to treat-
ment. In fact, none of them so much as requires the involvement of a 
physician. Two states, Florida and Iowa, do not even require that the 
offender be informed of the effects of treatment.56
D.   Florida’s Chemical Castration Statute 
 In 1997, Florida enacted its version of a chemical castration stat-
ute.57 Florida’s statute authorizes judges to sentence any defendant 
 49. Id. § 645. On February 21, 2006, Senator Bill Morrow introduced a proposed 
amendment to this law which would mandate treatment for first offenders and expand the 
age group of victims that would qualify second offenders for treatment to include victims 
up to sixteen years of age. S.B. 1382, 2005-06 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006). 
 50. CAL. PENAL CODE § 645.
 51. Id.
 52. Id.
 53. See FLA. STAT. § 794.0235 (2006); IOWA CODE § 903B.1 (2006); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 15:538(C) (2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-512 (2006); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 
144.625-.629 (2006); WIS. STAT. § 304.06(1q) (2006). “Georgia [had] also enacted a chemical 
castration law, but repealed [its law in 2006] for unspecified policy reasons.” Stinneford, 
supra note 16, at 562 n.14. Texas law permits sex offenders to petition for surgical castra-
tion under certain circumstances. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 501.061 (Vernon 2006). In addi-
tion, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Vermont have also considered proposals for 
chemical castration laws. Stinneford, supra note 16, at 585 n.172. 
 54. See Stinneford, supra note 16, at 580-81. 
 55. See id. at 579-81.
 56. Id. at 579. For further comparison of the various state laws, see id. at 578-84. 
 57. See FLA. STAT. § 794.0235 (1997). 
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who is convicted of a first offense of sexual battery, whether upon a 
child or upon an adult, to be “treated” with MPA.58 Furthermore, the 
statute mandates that Florida judges must sentence a defendant 
who has a prior sexual battery conviction and is subsequently con-
victed of sexual battery to MPA treatment.59 The judge must spec-
ify a duration of years of treatment, which may extend up to the 
life of the defendant.60
 Implementation of a sentence of MPA treatment is contingent 
upon a court-appointed “medical expert” making a determination, 
within sixty days of sentencing, “that the defendant is an appropriate 
candidate for [such] treatment.”61 While the statute does not “require 
the . . . treatment when it is not medically appropriate,”62 there is no 
requirement that the “medical expert” be a physician or that a physi-
cian be involved in any aspect of making such a determination. 
 If the defendant is sentenced to a period of incarceration preced-
ing probation, Florida’s statute provides that the administration of 
MPA shall begin no later than one week prior to the defendant’s re-
lease.63 However, there is no provision that any subsequent medical 
evaluation be conducted at that time, a time which could be years or 
even decades after the initial evaluation. 
 Similar to California’s statute, a defendant may exempt himself 
from this sentence only by voluntarily undergoing permanent surgi-
cal castration.64 Furthermore, if a defendant fails or refuses to allow 
the administration of MPA or to appear for its administration, the 
defendant does not merely violate the terms of his probation but is 
also automatically guilty of a separate, second degree felony.65
 Finally, the statute mandates that the DOC shall provide the ser-
vices necessary to administer the treatment.66 However, it does not 
provide any guidance as to how this is to be accomplished or how it is 
to be funded. 
 Since Florida’s chemical castration statute was enacted, only four 
cases have reached Florida’s district courts of appeal and no Florida 
case has turned on the constitutional validity of forcibly administer-
ing MPA to an unwilling probationer.67 In Houston v. State, the Fifth 
 58. Id. § 794.0235(1)(a). 
 59. Id. § 794.0235(1)(b). 
 60. Id. § 794.0235(2)(a). 
 61. Id.
 62. Id. § 794.0235(3). 
 63. Id. § 794.0235(2)(b). 
 64. Id. § 794.0235(1)(b). 
 65. Id. § 794.0235(5). 
 66. Id. § 794.0235(3). 
 67. In Houston v. State, 852 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003), the appellant did chal-
lenge the constitutionality of Florida’s chemical castration statute. Id. at 426, 428. How-
ever, the court overturned his sentence on technical, statutory grounds. Id. at 428. 
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District reversed the sentence of MPA treatment because the trial 
court failed to appoint a medical expert or specify a duration of years 
as required by the statute.68 In Jackson v. State, the Fourth District 
reversed the sentence of MPA treatment because the trial court 
failed to comply with the sixty day requirement for determining 
whether the defendant was an appropriate candidate for the treat-
ment and failed to specify a duration of years as required by the 
statute.69 The Fourth District did note that it was “odd” that the stat-
ute required a medical evaluation to be made within sixty days while 
at the same time requiring that the treatment commence not later 
than one week before the defendant’s release from prison.70 In De-
partment of Corrections v. Cosme, the circuit court had ordered the 
DOC to pay for the medical expert because the court had no funds of 
its own to do so.71 The Fifth District held that the statute does not 
require the DOC to pay for the medical expert,72 leaving unanswered 
the question as to who is to pay for the expert. The Fifth District also 
echoed the Fourth District’s sentiment that the procedure mandated 
by the statute is “very odd.”73 The court noted that by the time the 
MPA was to be administered, the medical evaluations would cer-
tainly be stale if not obsolete,74 and it further observed that since 
both defendants in that case had “received life sentences without pa-
role, . . . the treatments would only take place if the sentences were 
undone.”75 Finally, in Boone v. State the First District reversed the 
sentence of MPA treatment because the trial court failed to comply 
with unspecified mandatory statutory procedures prior to ordering 
MPA treatment.76
III.   LEGAL PROBLEMS WITH THE STATUTE
 There is a host of doctrines and constitutional provisions under 
which Florida’s statute could be challenged and would most likely 
fail, including equal protection, procedural due process, waiver, men-
tal autonomy, vagueness, and double jeopardy.77 This Comment will 
 68. Id.
 69. Jackson v. State, 907 So. 2d 696, 698-99 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). 
 70. Id. at 698. 
 71. Dep’t of Corr. v. Cosme, 917 So. 2d 1049, 1050 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006). 
 72. Id. at 1051. 
 73. Id. at 1050. 
 74. Id. at 1051. 
 75. Id.
 76. Boone v. State, 933 So. 2d 1252, 1254 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (citing Jackson v. State, 
907 So. 2d 696, 697 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); Houston v. State, 852 So. 2d 425, 428 (Fla. 5th 
DCA 2003)). 
 77. For a discussion of those provisions and arguments which are beyond the scope of 
this Comment, see Beckman, supra note 22, at 867-69 (discussing equal protection); id. at 
882-85 (discussing procedural due process); id. at 893-94 (discussing waiver of constitu-
tional protections); Fitzgerald, supra note 26, at 27-31 (discussing mental autonomy); 
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concern itself with the most egregious violations: the constitutional 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the constitu-
tional protection of the substantive due process liberty and privacy 
interests in refusing unwanted medical treatment, and the doc-
trine of informed consent. 
A.   Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
 Punishment that is cruel and unusual is prohibited by the Eighth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution78 as applied to the 
states by the Fourteenth Amendment79 and is also specifically pro-
hibited by Florida’s Constitution.80 The Florida Constitution provides 
that its own prohibition “shall be construed in conformity with deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court which interpret the prohi-
bition against cruel and unusual punishment provided in the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.”81
 Three tests have evolved in United States Supreme Court juris-
prudence to determine whether a given punishment is cruel and un-
usual. The first is whether the punishment is inherently cruel,82 that 
is, whether it is cruel in and of itself, without regard to the particular 
offender or the underlying offense. As the Court explained in Gregg v. 
Georgia, the eighth amendment meaning of cruel and unusual is not 
static, but rather “ ‘must draw its meaning from the evolving stan-
dards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’ ”83 The 
second test, first articulated by the Court in Weems v. United States,
is whether the punishment is grossly out of proportion to the of-
fense.84 The third test is whether the punishment is excessive.85 This 
term was defined by the Court in Furman v. Georgia when it stated, 
“A punishment is excessive . . . if it is unnecessary: The infliction of a 
severe punishment by the State cannot comport with human dignity 
when it is nothing more than the pointless infliction of suffering.”86
 Whether Florida’s chemical castration scheme violates the prohi-
bition against cruel and unusual punishment also depends on 
whether the forced administration of MPA is considered a treatment 
or a punishment. The effective use of MPA as treatment for a physio-
Spalding, supra note 18, at 123-25 (discussing vague statutory provisions); id. at 133-35 
(discussing double jeopardy). 
 78. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  
 79. See id. amend. XIV. 
 80. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 17. 
 81. Id.
 82. Fitzgerald, supra note 26, at 36. 
 83. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 
101 (1958)). 
 84. Id. (citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)). 
 85. Id. (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 392-93 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)). 
 86. Furman, 408 U.S. at 279 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
2007]         FLORIDA’S CHEMICAL CASTRATION STATUTE 1231 
                                                                                                                   
logical and psychological condition can be beneficial both to the indi-
vidual undergoing treatment and to society. However, when chemi-
cally induced biological alteration of an individual is forced upon him 
against his will by the state, such an imposition arguably ceases to 
be a treatment and becomes a punishment. 
 One federal district court applied a useful test for determining 
whether the administration of antipsychotic drugs should be classi-
fied as treatment or punishment: (1) whether the drug has any 
proven therapeutic value, (2) whether administration of the drug is 
recognized as an acceptable medical practice, (3) whether the adverse 
effects are unnecessarily harsh in relation to the long-term benefits, 
and (4) whether the drug treatment is part of an overall psycho-
therapeutic program.87 MPA’s therapeutic value is only proven as to 
paraphiliacs, and then only under certain conditions.88 Its forced ad-
ministration is not only not recognized as an acceptable medical 
practice, it is specifically denounced by the American Medical Asso-
ciation.89 In addition, MPA’s adverse effects are extremely harsh, es-
pecially when weighed against the total lack of benefit to non-
paraphilic offenders and the questionable benefit to paraphiliacs ab-
sent the counseling and support elements of an overall treatment 
program. Thus, the forced administration of MPA into an unwilling 
individual and absent a comprehensive treatment program clearly 
amounts to a punishment. 90
 As a punishment, the forced administration of MPA violates the 
first test for being cruel and unusual as to all offenders and the third 
test as to nonparaphilic offenders. The biological alteration of an in-
dividual against his will violates the first test because it is inherently 
cruel, in light of our (supposedly) maturing society’s evolving stan-
dards of decency,91 and “shock[s] general conscience . . . [and is] in-
tolerable in fundamental fairness.”92 One commentator has gone so 
far as to associate this punishment with the biological experiments 
conducted by Nazi Germany in World War II.93
 87. See Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1143 (D.N.J. 1978). 
88. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
89. See COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS’N, Court-Initiated
Medical Treatments in Criminal Cases 1 (1998), available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/369/ceja_4a98.pdf.
 90. Even assuming, arguendo, that such administration could be considered to be 
treatment, the nonconsensual aspect of it likely violates the individual’s substantive 
due process liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment. See discussion 
infra Part III.B. 
 91. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 92. This language is borrowed from the Eighth Circuit, which, in 1965, defined cruel 
and unusual punishment as that “of such character or consequences as to shock general 
conscience or to be intolerable in fundamental fairness.” Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970, 972 
(8th Cir. 1965). 
 93. Beckman, supra note 22, at 890. 
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 While MPA is technically not an experimental drug because it has 
been approved for use in women, the FDA has not approved the drug 
for any use in men because no clinical trials have determined MPA to 
be safe and effective for long-term use in men.94 As one commentator 
astutely observes, “pumping massive doses of female hormones into a 
male body . . . subjects offenders to severe physical [side] effects, 
some of which appear quite likely to have painful, disabling, and pos-
sibly fatal long-term effects.”95 Surely the infliction of this type of 
treatment on a fellow human being should shock the general con-
science and be intolerable in light of society’s evolving standards of 
decency. In the words of Justice Jackson in his concurrence in Skin-
ner v. Oklahoma, “[t]here are limits to the extent to which a legisla-
tively represented majority may conduct biological experiments at 
the expense of the dignity and personality and natural powers of a 
minority—even those who have been guilty of what the majority de-
fine as crimes.”96
 The forced administration of MPA also violates the third test as 
applied to nonparaphilic offenders: whether the punishment is exces-
sive or unnecessary. Experts have identified four distinct types of sex 
offenders.97 Type I denies that the act was a crime.98 Type II ac-
knowledges that he has committed a crime, but blames outside fac-
tors, such as alcohol, drugs, or stress.99 “Type III is the violent of-
fender who is driven by nonsexual motivation, such as anger, power, 
or violence.”100 Type IV is the paraphiliac, whose crime is driven by 
sexual arousal characterized by a specific sexual fantasy.101 Of these, 
only paraphiliacs have been shown to effectively benefit from MPA 
treatment.102 The nonparaphilic offender is not helped, and conse-
quentially, society is not protected by “treating” these individuals 
with MPA injections. Because there is no proven benefit to be derived 
from administering MPA to the first three types of offenders, the 
punishment is excessive as to these offenders in that it involves “un-
necessary and wanton infliction of pain.”103 In the words of a leading 
and oft-cited commentator, 
 94. Stinneford, supra note 16, at 572. While the FDA has not approved MPA for use 
in men, once a drug is approved for one particular use, doctors may prescribe it for unap-
proved uses under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. Id.
 95. Id. at 568; see also supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text. 
 96. 316 U.S. 535, 546-47 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 97. See Fitzgerald, supra note 26, at 4. 
 98. Id.
 99. Id.
 100. Id.
 101. Id.
 102. Id. at 5. 
 103. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (“[P]unishment must not involve 
the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 
392-93 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)). 
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[T]here is a tendency to consider all sex offenders as being compa-
rable, but there is a wide difference in behavior among sex offend-
ers. This tendency to generalize will subject inappropriate offend-
ers to MPA treatment. . . . MPA should only be prescribed for those 
offenders to whom it offers the promise of hope. Otherwise, MPA is 
an inappropriate or ineffective treatment, or punishment, mas-
querading as treatment, which violates the eighth amendment.104
B.   Substantive Due Process 
1.   The Federal Constitution 
 The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”105 Among protected liberty in-
terests is the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment. The 
United States Supreme Court first recognized this interest in Wash-
ington v. Harper when it held that prisoners possess “a significant 
liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsy-
chotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”106 This concept was affirmed just four months later in 
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, when the Court 
again recognized that competent persons may have a constitutionally 
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment.107
The Court did note, however, that intruding on an individual’s rec-
ognized liberty interest does not per se violate the Constitution; the 
intrusion must be evaluated by balancing the individual’s liberty in-
terest against the state’s relevant interests.108
 In Harper, the Court, noting that “[t]he extent of a prisoner’s right 
under the [Due Process] Clause to avoid the unwanted administra-
tion of antipsychotic drugs must be defined in the context of the in-
mate’s confinement,”109 applied the standard of review for prison 
regulations, which is whether a regulation is “ ‘reasonably related to 
 104. Fitzgerald, supra note 26, at 59 (citations omitted and emphasis added). 
 105. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 106. 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990). 
 107. 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990). While some commentators have mistakenly character-
ized this decision as recognizing a privacy right, see, e.g., Keesling, supra note 22, at 400-
01, the Court specifically declined to so hold in that case. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279 n.7 (stat-
ing that “[a]lthough many state courts have held that a right to refuse treatment is encom-
passed by a generalized constitutional right of privacy, we have never so held. We believe 
this issue is more properly analyzed in terms of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty inter-
est.”); see also infra note 118. 
 108. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982)). 
 109. 494 U.S. at 222. The Court further emphasized that “[t]here are few cases in 
which the State’s interest in combating the danger posed by a person to both himself and 
others is greater than in a prison environment.” Id. at 225. 
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legitimate penological interests.’ ”110 The Court held that Washing-
ton’s policy, under which the state would forcibly administer antipsy-
chotic drugs to an incarcerated individual whose mental illness rep-
resented a significant danger to himself or others, was reasonably re-
lated to the state’s legitimate interests in protecting the individual 
himself, other prisoners, and prison staff from serious harm.111 The 
court thus concluded that, considering the state’s legitimate pe-
nological interest, Washington’s regulation did not impermissibly 
infringe on a prisoner’s liberty interests when administration of 
the drugs was in the prisoner’s medical interest and was “for no 
purpose other than treatment, and only under the direction of a li-
censed psychiatrist.”112
 In 1992, the United States Supreme Court addressed for the first 
time the forced administration of drugs to a pretrial detainee.113 In 
Riggins v. Nevada, the Court recognized as a constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interest a defendant’s right to refuse unwanted medical 
treatment, observing that such an individual “ ‘retain[s] at least 
those constitutional rights that we have held are enjoyed by con-
victed prisoners.’ ”114 The Court held that the state had deprived the 
defendant of his protected liberty interest when it administered an-
tipsychotic drugs in order to make the defendant competent to 
stand trial.115 The holding specifically requires states to consider 
“less intrusive alternatives” before administering medication 
against a defendant’s will.116
 In weighing the defendant’s liberty interest against the state’s le-
gitimate interests, while the Court acknowledged that the reason-
ableness test ordinarily applied to state infringements of “ ‘funda-
mental constitutional rights’ ” is more restrictive than that applied to 
prison regulations,  the Court specifically stopped short of applying 
a strict scrutiny standard.
117
118 However, the Court did shift the burden 
from the defendant to the state to establish the need for medical 
treatment once the defendant moves to terminate such treatment.119
 110. Id. at 223 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987), and citing O’Lone v. 
Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987)). 
 111. Id. at 226-27. 
 112. Id.
 113. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992). 
 114. Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979)). 
 115. Id. at 137-38. 
 116. Id. at 135. 
 117. Id. (quoting O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987)). 
 118. Id. at 136. Again, some commentators have misconstrued the Court’s standard, 
leading to a flawed analysis under strict scrutiny that, if relied upon, could lead unwary 
defendants perilously down the path of an ultimately doomed argument. See, e.g., Kees-
ling, supra note 22, at 396-406; see also supra note 107. 
 119. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135. 
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 It is thus clear from well-established case law that Florida’s sex 
offenders do have a protected liberty interest under the United 
States Constitution in being free from the unwanted administration 
of MPA. The questions that must be addressed are whether Florida 
has a legitimate interest that outweighs this liberty interest and 
whether that interest can be served by a less intrusive alternative. 
 In the case of nonparaphilic offenders, or even paraphilic offend-
ers who are unwilling to undergo MPA treatment and are therefore 
unlikely to benefit from it, the state’s interests clearly do not out-
weigh the individual’s liberty interest, since no legitimate state in-
terest will be served by administering the drug. In the case of 
paraphilic offenders, particularly those who are willing to undergo 
the treatment and for whom it is most likely to be successful, the 
state does have a legitimate interest in protecting the safety of those 
members of society against whom the paraphiliac is likely to reof-
fend. While the side effects of the drug are potentially quite severe, 
no alternative has been shown to be effective in preventing recidivist 
paraphilic behavior, with the exception of a period of incarceration 
during which the individual is physically constrained from reoffend-
ing. Thus, for the narrowly defined group of paraphilic offenders who 
are willing to undergo the treatment, the “forced” administration of 
MPA should pass Fourteenth Amendment constitutional muster. 
However, as to these offenders, this argument is moot, because if an 
individual is willing to undergo the treatment, then the treatment is 
not unwanted, thus the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment 
is not invoked. 
2.   The Florida Constitution 
 Unlike individuals in most states, Floridians have another layer 
of constitutional protection against the forced administration of un-
wanted medical treatment. The right to privacy, which has been ju-
dicially read into the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution from the penumbra of the various amendments,120 is 
specifically embodied in Florida’s Constitution, which provides that 
“[e]very natural person has the right to be let alone and free from 
governmental intrusion into the person’s private life except as oth-
erwise provided herein.”121 The Florida Supreme Court has held in In
re Guardianship of Browning that this right to privacy encompasses 
the right of a competent person “to choose or refuse medical treat-
ment, and that right extends to all relevant decisions concerning 
one’s health.”122  The Court “reinforced the all encompassing nature 
 120. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965). 
 121. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23. 
 122. 568 So. 2d 4, 11 (Fla. 1990) (emphasis added). 
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of this right by stating ‘[w]e see no reason to qualify that right on the 
basis of the denomination of a medical procedure as major or minor, 
ordinary or extraordinary, life-prolonging, life-maintaining, life-
sustaining, or otherwise.’ ”123
 In 1996, one year before Florida’s chemical castration statute was 
passed, the Florida Supreme Court considered a case in which a pris-
oner on a hunger strike was seeking an injunction against forced nu-
trition and medication.124 In Singletary v. Costello, the Court held 
that the individual’s status as a prisoner did not vitiate his privacy 
right to refuse medical treatment.125 The Court applied a strict scru-
tiny analysis, in which the prisoner’s privacy interest could only be 
overcome if there were a compelling state interest sufficient to over-
ride that right and if the means of implementing such a state inter-
est were “narrowly tailored in the least intrusive manner possible to 
safeguard the rights of the individual.”126
 The Court looked to its earlier analysis in Browning, in which the 
Court had identified four state interests for consideration and bal-
ancing against an individual’s right to refuse unwanted medical 
treatment: “1. the preservation of life; 2. the protection of innocent 
third parties; 3. the prevention of suicide; and 4. the maintenance of 
the ethical integrity of the medical profession;”127 with the first being 
the most significant and the last being the least significant.128 Con-
sidering these four factors, the Court in Singletary held that even 
with the preservation of life being the most important state interest, 
that interest, in and of itself, was not sufficient to overcome the “fun-
damental nature” of even a prisoner’s privacy right.129
 Applying this analysis to Florida’s chemical castration statute 
yields an even stronger result. Florida case law has clearly identified 
a protected privacy right under the Florida Constitution to refuse 
unwanted medical treatment.130 The United States Supreme Court, 
in evaluating the level of privacy that can reasonably be expected by 
a probationer (as opposed to an ordinary citizen), recently reiterated 
that probation is “one point . . . on a continuum of possible punish-
 123. Singletary v. Costello, 665 So. 2d 1099, 1104 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (quoting Brown-
ing, 568 So. 2d at 11 n.6). 
 124. Id. at 1101. 
 125. Id. at 1105. 
 126. Id. (citing Browning, 568 So. 2d at 14). 
 127. Id.
 128. Id. Regarding the fourth consideration, the Court stated, “ ‘[r]ecognition of the 
right to refuse necessary treatment in appropriate circumstances is consistent with exist-
ing medical mores; such a doctrine does not threaten either the integrity of the medi-
cal profession, the proper role of hospitals in caring for such patients or the State’s in-
terest in protecting the same.” Id. (quoting Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 163 
(Fla. 4th DCA 1978)). 
 129. Id. at 1110. 
 130. Id. at 1102.  
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ments ranging from solitary confinement in a maximum-security fa-
cility to a few hours of mandatory community service.”131 Applying 
the Court’s continuum analysis, a probationer can reasonably expect 
some greater level of privacy than that afforded to prisoners. 
 While a probationer clearly has a privacy interest in refusing un-
wanted medical treatment, this interest must still be balanced 
against Florida’s state interest in administering MPA to sex offend-
ers. Unlike the state in Singletary, Florida’s interest under its 
chemical castration statute is in the second category: the protection 
of innocent third parties. If the first and “most significant” category, 
the preservation of life, is not sufficient to overcome the privacy in-
terest of a prisoner, surely the second, lesser category is not suffi-
cient to overcome the privacy interest of a nonincarcerated proba-
tioner. Thus Florida’s chemical castration statute fails the state in-
terest prong of strict scrutiny analysis. 
 Even if Florida’s statute were to somehow survive the state inter-
est prong of strict scrutiny analysis, it would fail the narrow tailoring 
prong. As previously discussed,132 a significant percentage of indi-
viduals to whom MPA would be forcibly administered under Florida’s 
statute are those for whom it would have no benefit. Because Flor-
ida’s statute is not narrowly tailored, even if it were to potentially 
pass a federal constitutional challenge under rational basis scrutiny 
as applied to a narrow class of individuals—those paraphiliacs who 
are willing to undergo the treatment and are thus likely to benefit 
from it—the statute would fail a facial state constitutional challenge 
under strict scrutiny as being impermissibly overbroad. 
C.   Informed Consent 
 The notion of administering MPA only to those paraphiliacs who 
are willing to undergo the treatment (and could therefore potentially 
benefit from it) begs further analysis under the doctrine of informed 
consent. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has itself ac-
knowledged that the right to refuse medical treatment is itself a 
“logical corollary” of the doctrine of informed consent.133
 In Canterbury v. Spence, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals defined 
“[t]he root premise” of the doctrine of informed consent as “the con-
cept, fundamental in American jurisprudence, that ‘[e]very human 
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what 
 131. See Sampson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2197 (2006). 
 132. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 133. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990).  
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shall be done with his own body . . . .’ ” 134 As succinctly summarized 
by Professor Fitzgerald, 
[t]he doctrine of informed consent requires the physician to provide 
the individual with all the information relevant to his treatment. 
The individual must then choose, in accordance with his values 
and judgment, whether to undergo the treatment. The individual’s 
decision should be controlling throughout the treatment, and the in-
dividual may reject the treatment or withdraw from the treatment 
at any time, even if the treatment is judged to be beneficial.135
 The Florida Supreme Court expressly adopted the informed con-
sent doctrine in State v. Presidential Women’s Center,136 stating that 
“a physician has an obligation to advise his or her patient of the ma-
terial risks of undergoing a medical procedure”137 and adding that 
“[u]nless a person knows the risks and dangers of . . . a procedure, ‘a 
“consent” does not represent a choice and is ineffectual.’ ”138 This con-
cept was perhaps best articulated by Florida’s Fifth District Court of 
Appeal in Buckner v. Allergan Pharmaceuticals:
A doctor’s duty is to “inform his patient what a reasonable prudent 
medical specialist would tell a person of ordinary understanding of 
the serious risks and the possibility of serious harm which may oc-
cur from a supposed course of therapy so that the patient’s choice 
will be an intelligent one, based upon sufficient knowledge to enable 
him to balance the possible risks against the possible benefits.”139
 Florida’s chemical castration statute does not require that an in-
dividual upon whom a sentence of MPA treatment is imposed be so 
informed, nor does it permit him to consent. Were the statute to re-
quire that the treatment be prescribed and administered by a physi-
cian, it is likely that the subject individual would, at a minimum, be 
informed even absent a statutory requirement because of physicians’ 
legal, ethical, and professional obligation to provide such information 
and their liability for not doing so as codified in the Florida Stat-
utes.140 However, because Florida’s chemical castration statute 
does not require the involvement of a physician at any point, the 
probability that the individual will be informed is one that can not 
be assumed. 
 134. 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972) (quoting 
Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914)). 
 135. Fitzgerald, supra note 26, at 18. 
 136. 937 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 2006). 
 137. Id. at 116 (citing Thomas v. Berrios, 348 So. 2d 905, 907 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)). 
 138. Id. (quoting Bowers v. Talmage, 159 So. 2d 888, 889 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963)). 
 139. 400 So. 2d 820, 823 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (quoting Zebarth v. Swedish Hosp. Med. 
Ctr., 499 P.2d 1, 11 (1972)). 
 140. See FLA. STAT. § 766.103 (2006). 
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 Furthermore, even if the individual is informed, Florida’s chemi-
cal castration statute and its probationary scheme expressly deny 
him the right to consent (or not) to the treatment. While the United 
States Supreme Court has never ruled on the right of a convicted de-
fendant to refuse probation,141 Florida’s Fifth District has specifically 
held that Florida defendants have no such right.142 Worse, if a defen-
dant refuses to “consent” to a probationary condition of MPA treat-
ment, he is not only subject to the penalties associated with violating 
his probation, he is automatically guilty of a separate, second degree 
felony as well.143 The only choice that an individual who is sentenced 
to receive MPA treatment is offered is the choice to be surgically cas-
trated instead.144 This is arguably not a real choice. 
IV.   IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS WITH THE STATUTE
 According to a memo generated in response to the DOC’s April 12, 
2005 report,145 the primary reason that Florida’s judges have not 
been sentencing eligible sex offenders to MPA treatment as man-
dated by statute seems to be that both prosecutors and judges were 
largely unaware of the statute or of the defendants’ triggering quali-
fications.146 With the attention that the statute is now receiving,147
this is likely to change.148 As sentencing to MPA treatment begins to 
be imposed with greater frequency, the flaws in the statute will be-
come apparent. This will become evident not only in challenges on 
appeal as to the legality and constitutionality of the statute but also 
in difficulties in implementing the statute as written.149
 One of the most obvious “oddities” in the statute has already been 
noted by both the Fourth and Fifth Districts.150 The statute requires 
that a determination be made within sixty days of an offender’s sen-
 141. See Beckman, supra note 22, at 885. 
 142. Evans v. State, 544 So. 2d 1160, 1161 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). 
 143. FLA. STAT. § 794.0235(5) (2006). 
 144. Id. § 794.0235(1)(b). 
 145. Garringer Memo, supra note 12, and accompanying text. 
 146. Id. at 6-7. There is no indication that judges have not been complying because 
they have misgivings about the statute itself. See id.
 147. See supra notes 14, 70, 73-75 and accompanying text. In addition, Mr. Garringer 
reminded trial court judges of the requirements of the statute in a presentation he gave at 
a 2006 conference. Les Garringer, Address at the 2006 Annual Education Program of the 
Florida Conference of Circuit Judges in Orlando, Florida (Dec. 4, 2006). 
 148. For example, on December 7, 2006, three days after attending the judges’ con-
ference, see supra note 147, Judge Fred Hardt in Collier County, Florida, handed 
down that county’s first chemical castration sentence. Convicted Rapist Gets Castra-
tion Sentence, BONITA DAILY NEWS (Bonita Springs, Fla.), Dec. 7, 2006,  
http://www.bonitanews.com/news/2006/dec/07/convicted_rapist_gets_castration_sentence. 
 149. As early as Gauntlett, the Michigan Court of Appeals foreshadowed many of these 
issues when questioning the trial court’s order of MPA treatment. See People v. Gauntlett, 
352 N.W.2d 310, 313-17 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984). 
 150. See supra notes 70, 73-75 and accompanying text. 
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tencing as to whether he is an “appropriate candidate” for treat-
ment.151 However, treatment may not commence for years or even 
decades in the likely event that the individual is incarcerated prior to 
being released on probation.152 The Fourth District opined that “it 
would seem more appropriate to make the medical determination 
closer in time to the release date. It could very well be that with the 
passage of time the medical determination that the defendant is an 
appropriate candidate for MPA will have changed.”153
 If the offender does not receive an evaluation contemporaneously 
with his release, he will have an obvious due process challenge. If 
such an evaluation is conducted, the statute provides no guidance as 
to what such an evaluation would require. As Mr. Garringer ob-
served, “this entire process has one fatal flaw. When the prisoner is 
scheduled for release, the Department of Corrections must begin the 
process [of medically evaluating the individual] de novo.”154 This ne-
cessitates finding another medical expert, paying for another evalua-
tion, and possibly conducting additional hearings if the evaluation is 
challenged. In the words of Mr. Garringer, “[c]ertainly the [DOC], or 
any physician, would not rely on an evaluation that occurred years 
earlier in administering the treatment. They would certainly recog-
nize that a person’s tolerance to the substance could be affected after 
years of incarceration, and improper administration of MPA could 
create serious side effects.”155 One would hope so.
 A second issue is the determination of who is an “appropriate can-
didate.”  The statute provides no guidance as to the interpretation of 
that term. This leaves open a range of discretion on the part of the 
DOC, the medical expert, and the judiciary that is not only likely to 
be constitutionally overbroad but will also create a wide disparity 
from circuit to circuit as to who is eligible for—or subjected to—the 
treatment. Certainly women would be excluded, but beyond that, an 
appropriate candidate could range from anyone who can tolerate the 
risks and side effects without grave danger to those willing paraphil-
iacs who might actually be helped by the treatment. In addition, the 
statute makes no provision for periodic evaluation and ongoing moni-
toring of how the individual is tolerating the treatment. It is quite 
possible that someone who is an “appropriate candidate” at the time 
of sentencing, and even at the time of commencement of treatment, 
will no longer be so after a number of years. 
 A third issue is the qualification and retention of the “medical ex-
pert.” Nothing in the statute expressly requires that the medical ex-
 151. FLA. STAT. § 794.0235(2)(a) (2006). 
 152. See id. § 794.0235(2)(b). 
 153. Jackson v. State, 907 So. 2d 696, 698 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). 
 154. Garringer Memo, supra note 12, at 8. 
 155. Id. at 4. 
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pert be a physician. Even if that were to be inferred, there is no re-
quirement that the physician be a psychiatrist with training and ex-
perience in diagnosing paraphilia or that he have any knowledge of 
or experience with the effects of large doses of MPA in men. The train-
ing and specialization of the medical expert thus has the potential to 
greatly influence who is identified as an appropriate candidate. 
 A fourth issue, raised in part by the Fifth District,156 is the fund-
ing of the program. The House Committee on Crime and Punishment 
(House Committee) stated that the bill would have “no fiscal im-
pact.”157 The Senate Criminal Justice Committee (Senate Commit-
tee), however, came to quite a different conclusion, determining that 
the cost of treating only those individuals for whom MPA treatment 
is statutorily mandated would exceed $50 million over twenty years, 
assuming the treatment continued only for the average probation 
term of six years.158 Each individual for whom a discretionary sen-
tence of MPA was ordered would add over $70 thousand to that cost 
over twenty years.159
 Neither of these fiscal impact analyses takes into account the 
payment of the medical expert, and the statute makes no provision 
for such payment.160 Furthermore, as noted by Mr. Garringer, the 
costs of paying the medical expert will likely not be limited to the 
medical evaluation.161 Defense counsel also likely will want to depose 
the expert to determine whether to challenge the order of admini-
stration of MPA.162
 A fifth issue is liability.163 The statute provides no immunity from 
liability to either the DOC, the medical expert making the evalua-
tion, or any third party contractor who might be involved in adminis-
tering the treatment. Because the statute effectively precludes in-
formed consent, the likelihood of tort claims for the negative conse-
quences of the treatment is high. With no informed consent and no 
 156. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 157. HOUSE STATEMENT, supra note 11, at 1. In its Fiscal Research & Economic Impact 
Statement, the committee classified most of the fiscal effects as “indeterminate,” and in its 
comments, the committee found that “[t]he fiscal impact of [the] bill would consist primar-
ily of the cost of continued weekly injections (presently the cost is $40 per injection) given 
to each offender” and again reiterated that the bill has “no fiscal impact.” Id. at 6-8. 
 158. CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM. ET AL., SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT 
STATEMENT 7-9 (1997) [hereinafter SENATE STATEMENT].
 159. Id.
 160. In Cosme, the Fifth District specifically invited the Florida Justice Administration 
Commission to file a response to help the court determine who is to fund the medical 
evaluations. Dep’t of Corr. v. Cosme, 917 So. 2d 1049, 1051 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006). The 
Commission, however, declined, leaving the court “know[ing] little or nothing about the 
funding or lack of funding of these evaluations by the legislature.” Id.
 161. Garringer Memo, supra note 12, at 8. 
 162. Id.
 163. For further discussion, see id.; see also SENATE STATEMENT, supra note 1598, at 9. 
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immunity from liability, the task of recruiting physicians or other 
medical experts to participate in the program will be challenging 
at best. 
 A sixth issue is how MPA treatment is to be logistically adminis-
tered. As noted by the House Committee, the DOC “does not have the 
infrastructure necessary to administer these treatments.”164 The 
Senate Committee further observed that “[i]t is not feasible to expect 
this group [of probationers] (particularly indigent ones with trans-
portation issues) to receive monthly treatments outside of the com-
munities in which they live. However, neither community correc-
tional centers or [sic] probation and parole offices possess the infra-
structure necessary to administer treatment.”165 The Senate Commit-
tee noted that this lack of sufficient infrastructure would necessitate 
contracting with community health providers to administer the 
drug.166 The involvement of third party contractors would add an-
other layer of complication to the already challenging task of track-
ing probationers’ compliance with the program. 
 A seventh issue concerns the supervision of the individual if the 
ordered term of years of treatment exceeds the term of probation. 
Senate staff raised this very issue, noting that once an individual’s 
probation term ends, the person is no longer under DOC supervision 
and the DOC would no longer be able to file a warrant for the indi-
vidual’s arrest if he fails to report for MPA treatment.167 The re-
port candidly notes that this issue raises questions about what is 
to become of a defendant whose sentence to MPA administration 
exceeds the maximum period of confinement, questions which 
“staff cannot answer.”168
 Senate staff summed up the consequences of the vagueness of the 
statute on how it is to be implemented: “[I]f there are significant 
problems in determining how to implement this legislation, . . . [i]f 
‘men of common intelligence must guess’ at the meaning of a gov-
ernment restriction, the restriction is void . . . .”169
V.   RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
 The United States Supreme Court has identified “the two primary 
goals of probation—rehabilitation and protecting society from future 
violations.”170 Florida can and should redraft its chemical castration 
statute to comport with these policy goals, pass constitutional mus-
 164. HOUSE STATEMENT, supra note 11, at 3-4. 
 165. SENATE STATEMENT, supra note 158, at 4-5. 
 166. Id. at 5. 
 167. Id.
 168. Id. at 4. 
 169. Id. at 6 (quoting State v. Muller, 681 So. 2d 725, 727 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)). 
 170. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001). 
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ter, and overcome implementation hurdles. In order to draft an effec-
tive statute, however, the legislature must acknowledge, as it has in 
the reports of both chambers,171 that treatment with MPA has only 
been shown to be an effective therapy for paraphiliacs when those 
paraphiliacs volunteer for the treatment, when the treatment is ad-
ministered in conjunction with psychotherapy, and when certain 
other criteria are met.172
 First, to avoid constitutional overbreadth, Florida’s statute should 
reduce the scope of mandatory triggering offenses to those which are 
of the type likely to be committed by a paraphiliac, such as sexual 
battery on a child. The statute may make other offenses, such as 
sexual battery on an adult, a permissive trigger at the discretion of 
the court. Once the statute is triggered, the court should require a 
preliminary evaluation by a qualified psychiatrist to determine if the 
individual does indeed suffer from paraphilia. The statute should re-
quire such evaluation to be made after a first offense—there is no 
need to subject Florida’s communities to a second paraphilic crime 
before protecting it from such individuals. 
 For those offenders who are determined by preliminary evaluation 
to suffer from paraphilia, the option should be made available to 
them to volunteer for consideration for a treatment program as a 
condition of probation. Identifying those offenders who are paraphili-
acs and then giving them the option to volunteer for the program, 
rather than forcibly subjecting them to it, has several benefits. First, 
those paraphiliacs who volunteer for treatment are, by their action, 
self-identifying as individuals who are likely to benefit from the 
treatment. Second, the issues of cruel and unusual punishment and 
the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment go away, because the 
treatment is neither a punishment nor unwanted. 
 Following the preliminary evaluation, the individuals would still 
serve a period of incarceration determined by the judge under the 
sentencing guidelines of the underlying statute. While one leading 
commentator notes that “the incarceration of paraphiliacs is a futile 
exercise” as to the paraphiliac,173 incarceration still serves a deter-
rent function for sex offenses in general and should not be aban-
doned. However, a paraphiliac’s willingness to undergo the treat-
ment could be judicially considered as a factor in determining the 
length and nature of the offender’s sentence within the statutory 
guidelines for the underlying offense. If the legislature truly believes 
that the administration of MPA is an effective treatment and not a 
 171. See HOUSE STATEMENT, supra note 11, at 10; SENATE STATEMENT, supra note 
158, at 2. 
 172. See Fitzgerald, supra note 26, at 9. 
 173. Id. at 60. 
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punishment, it should not object to releasing a treated individual 
back into the community once it has been determined that the indi-
vidual is no longer a danger and can become a contributing member 
of society. 
 For those individuals who were determined, during the prelimi-
nary evaluation following sentencing, to suffer from paraphilia and 
therefore to be potential candidates for the treatment, a full medical 
and psychological evaluation should be made sufficiently close to the 
individual’s scheduled release to provide a meaningful prognosis for 
treatment. The treatment itself should begin sufficiently prior to the 
individual’s release to make the necessary adjustments to the medi-
cation to achieve the appropriate dosage for the paraphiliac to man-
age his condition. Before submitting to treatment, the individual 
should be fully informed as to the risks and possible side effects of 
the drug, including the risk that the drug might not work for him, 
and should be required to sign a waiver of liability. This subsequent 
and complete evaluation would eliminate procedural due process 
challenges arising from untimely evaluations and would comport 
with the common law doctrine of informed consent. It would also 
provide the greatest assurance that the individual can be safely inte-
grated back into society. 
 The state’s interest in protecting society and the probationer’s lib-
erty interest can be effectively balanced with a well-drafted statutory 
program. Probationary supervision, under this unique circumstance, 
should extend for the duration of the treatment program, although 
the level of supervision may be limited after a specified period of 
years to require only ongoing participation in the treatment program. 
The treatment program should be both mandated and funded by the 
state for as long as is necessary, up to the life of the individual, and 
should not include MPA injections alone, but should also include pe-
riodic medical assessment and ongoing psychological counseling. 
MPA alone will not successfully treat most offenders without indi-
vidualized psychotherapy.174
 In the interest of public safety, should the individual indicate his 
wish to terminate the therapy or any portion thereof, either ex-
pressly or by not showing up for his treatments, or should ongoing 
medical and psychological evaluation lead to the conclusion that the 
therapy is either no longer necessary or is not proceeding success-
fully, an additional psychiatric evaluation should be made to deter-
mine whether the individual is a danger to the community. If the in-
dividual is determined to be a danger, the court should have the dis-
 174. See Keesling, supra note 22, at 387 (citing Robert E. Freeman-Longo, Reducing
Sexual Abuse in America: Legislating Tougher Laws or Public Education and Prevention,
23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 303, 314 (1997)). 
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cretion to modify the sentence as appropriate, with options ranging 
from terminating the therapy and sending the individual on his way 
to incarceration up to the maximum amount permitted by the under-
lying statute. Should an individual who is undergoing treatment 
reoffend, courts should be given broad discretion in determining 
whether to continue to make treatment available to the individual or 
whether to incarcerate him for the protection of society. 
 By limiting the treatment only to those who are likely to benefit 
from it, two costs are reduced. The financial cost of administering an 
unnecessary drug is eliminated as to those individuals who will not 
benefit. Furthermore, the social cost of releasing nonbenefiting indi-
viduals back into the community, believing we are safe from them 
when in fact we are not, is also greatly reduced. As observed by Larry 
Helm Spalding, “[h]ow can Floridians be safe and secure if the court-
ordered drug treatment is administered to those whose motivation is 
not sex, but rather violence, hatred, and control, on the mistaken be-
lief that it is likely to have a measurable impact on the root causes of 
the defendant’s criminal behavior?”175 Granted, the proposed treat-
ment program is much more comprehensive than the one mandated 
by the current statute, and the costs of administration, even consid-
ering the reduced subgroup of those to whom the revised statute 
would apply, will likely be quite high. Nonetheless, the cost to society 
of not properly treating paraphilic sex offenders is not measured in 
dollars, but in the lives of victims who are unnecessarily exposed to 
these individuals for so long as we fail to provide comprehensive, ef-
fective treatment. The people of the state of Florida can no longer af-
ford the cost of a band-aid statute that gratifies the popular desire to 
cut off the offending parts of sex offenders. We need a statute that 
cuts off the offense. 
VI.   EPILOGUE
 In 1996, Larry Don McQuay was again sentenced to prison, this 
time for twenty years, after having confessed to the 1989 molestation 
of a nine-year-old girl.176 In 1997, Texas passed a law allowing in-
mates to elect to be surgically castrated.177 According to McQuay’s 
lawyer, McQuay underwent the procedure.178 On May 4, 2005, 
McQuay was released from prison for “good behavior” after having 
 175. Spalding, supra note 18, at 138. 
 176. Renee C. Lee & Robert Crowe, Convict Who Sought Castration Released: Molester 
Whose Requests Led to State Legalization of the Procedure Will Be Monitored, HOUSTON 
CHRON., May 4, 2005, at B1. 
 177. TEX. GOV’T. CODE ANN. § 501.061 (Vernon 2006); see also id. § 508.226 (parole 
panel may not mandate castration). 
 178. ABC NEWS, supra note 3. 
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served less than half of his twenty-year sentence.179 He will be elec-
tronically monitored via an ankle bracelet until 2016.180
 179. See Lee & Crowe, supra note 176. 
 180. See ABC NEWS, supra note 3. 
